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Brief of Intervenor-Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Intervenor accepts the statement of facts as set
forth by appellants except as to appellants' characterization of the decision of this court in Bird & Jex Co. v.
Funk ( 1939) 96 Ut. 450, 85 P .2d 831, and the conclusion that the decision in that case is dispositive of the
question in the instant case.
I

Intervenor is a Nevada corporation authorized to
do business in the State of Utah and is engaged in the
business of outdoor advertising. In reliance on the
Liquor Control Commission's regulation #4, intervenor
entered into agreements and contracts to advertise light
beer on its billboards throughout the State of Utah.
A revocation of this order would deprive intervenor
and all other outdoor advertisers doing business in
Utah of a valuable source of revenue.
ARGUMENT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
There is no question that the summary judgment
procedure was the proper vehicle for disposition of this
case by the lower court. There was no genuine issue as
to any material fact. The Utah Liquor Control Commission had amended its regulations to permit, under
certain strict conditions, the advertising of light beer
on outdoor advertising structures. The question
whether by so doing the Commission had exceeded its
statutory authority is clearly one of law. Either the
Liquor Control Act, Sections 32-1-1to32-)-43, U.C.A.,
1953, gives the Commission that authority or it doesn't.
Since both the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for
summary judgment, one of the movants was entitled
to judgment as a matter of law as provided by Rule
56 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Tbe
regulations are not challenged as being indefinite or
ambiguous or upon any similar ground. The sole ques2

tion is whether the state agency has the authority to
promulgate them.
It is intervenor's position that the Utah Liquor
Control Commission had the authority to amend its
rules and regulations and promulgate those in question
and that, therefore, the ruling of the lower court was
proper and should be affirmed.

POINT I
THE STATE LIQUOR COMMISSION HAS
THE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE REGULATIONS ALLOWING THE ADVERTISING OF LIGHT BEER ON BILLBOARDS.
Plaintiffs allege that the Liquor Commission has
acted outside of the statutory delegation of power from
the legislature in (I) repealing certain regulations
which prohibited the billboard advertising of alcoholic
beverages or (2) adopting regulations specially designed to authorize such advertising upon clearly defined conditions.
Section 32-1-7, U.C.A., 1953, defines the Liquor
Commission's power to make regulations as follows:
"The Commission may, from time to time,
make such resolutions, orders and regulations,
not inconsistent with this act, as it may deem
necessary for carrying out the provisions thereof
and for its efficient administration ... The Commission may amend or repeal such regulations
... " (Emphasis added).
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It is thus clear that the Commission has the power

to amend or repeal any regulations promulgated under
the act. The only remaining question then is whether
the regulations in question are "inconsistent with this
act".
Section 32-7-27, U.C.A., provides:

"The prohibition against advertising alcoholic
beverages and against window displays in liquor
stores of the Commission shall apply in like
manner to all manufacturers and licensees of
alcoholic beverages, and to package agencies.
This provision shall be construed to prohibit the
use of any electric or illuminated signs, contrivance or device, signboard, billboard, or other display signs, and to prohibit the display of alcoholic beverages or price lists in windows or show
cases visible to passersby, and to prohibit the
use of any other means of inducing persons to
buy alcoholic beverages, or to enter places where
alcoholic beverages are sold ; provided, that a
simple designation of the fact that beer, wine,
or other liquors are manufactured or sold under
authority derived from the Commission may be
placed in or upon the window or front of the
place of business having such authority; and
provided, further, that advertising of light beer
shall be permitted under such regulation aJ the
Commission may make." (Emphasis added).
The definition section of the liquor control act,
insofar as pertinent, is as follows:
"The following words and phrases used in this
act shall have the following meaning, unless a
different meaning clearly appears from the context:
4

"Alcoholic beverage" means and includes
"beer" and "liquor" as they are defined herein

"

Eliminating excess verbage, the effect of Section
32-7-27, U.C.A., as applied to the problem at hand
is to prohibit outdoor advertising of alcoholic beverages
except the outdoor advertising of light beer under regulations promulgated by the Commission. If the Commission has no authority to issue regulations authorizing
the advertising of light beer, the last proviso of the
section would have no meaning whatsoever. It would
be incongruous to interpret the section to mean that
the legislature intended to provide an exception for
advertising of light beer under regulations issued by
the Commission if the Commission did not have any
authority to issue any regulation to make the proviso
effective.
Justice Wolfe pointed out in his dissent in Bird
& Jex v. Fwnk, supra at p. 837, concerning the same
proviso at issue before this court, that the proviso was
tacked on to the draft of the bill that was sent to the
legislature. It is not conceivable that the legislature
would tack on a proviso to a bill that they knew or
had reason to believe would not be of any effect. It is
far more logical to believe that the legislature saw a
need for amplification or clarification of the original
version of the bill and a necessity for making a specific
exception to the general prohibition contained in the
original text.
The general rule for the interpretation of statutes
5

is, of course, to ascertain, and if possible to give effect
to the intention or purpose of the legislature as expressed in the statute, 82 C.J.S. 560. The intention of
the Utah legislature in passing the instant provision
of the Liquor Control Act is clear. By tacking on the
words "and provided, further, that advertising of light
beer shall be permitted under such regulation as the
Commission may make" the legislature effectively expressed its intention to depart from the regular definition of alcoholic beverages and provide that for this
purpose, namely that of advertising light beer, the
broader prohibition preceding the proviso was not to
be applicable.
A second and corollary principle of statutory con·
struction is that of utilizing the rule of ejusdem generis
where necessary to give a provision a meaning con·
sistent with the legislative intent.
In Stone v. Salt Lake City (1960) 11 Ut. 2d 196,
356 P.2d 631 and Hatch Co. v. Public Service Com·
mission (1954) 3 Ut. 2d 7, 277 P.2d 809, this court held
that specific terms used in a statute provide the limits
for interpreting the general term. Thus, the legislative
intent of the second provision, 32-7-27, becomes crystal
clear. This proviso was a cutting out, separation or
exclusion of light beer from the earlier prohibitions
applicable to alcoholic beverages as a broader category.
If this proviso is to be given any meaning at all, it must
be considered as a specific exception to the general pro·
sicriptions applied to alcoholic bever~ges as distin·
guished from non-alcoholic beverages.
6

POINT II
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN BIRD & JEX V. FUNK IS NOT DISPOSITIVE OF THIS CASE.
The appellants assert that Bird & Jex v. Funk is
controlling for the proposition that the statute prohibits the outdoor advertising of light beer. They quote
from the decision what they characterize as the holding
of this court in that case:

"Holding as we do that billboard and other
outdoor display advertising is prohibited by the
act, the appellants are in no position to question
the validity of the other regulations adopted by
the Commission, and for that reason we refrain
from passing on them." 85 P.2d 837 (Emphasis added).
A careful analysis of the decision, however, will
show that the underscored language did not represent
the holding of the case. The court, carefully and specifically, described the limits of this decision with the
following language:
"The question whether or not the powers
granted to the Liquor Commission are constitutional is not in dispute here, although appellants intimate that if the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Liquor Commission are determined by this court to be within the powers
granted by the legislature to the Commission
then such delegation of powers must of necessity be unconstitutional. The only question to
be determined at the moment is . . . does the
7

Liqiwr Control Commission have the power to
prohibit the billboard advertising in the face of
the last proviso in (32-7-27, U.C.A., 1953)."
(Emphasis added).

This court decided, therefore, only that the Com- ,
mission had such authority. This is the sole proposition
for which Bird & Jex can be cited. The proposition that '
the Commission has no authority to promulgate regulations authorizing billboard advertising of light beer
does not follow from the proposition that the Commission has authority to issue regulations prohibiting the
advertising of beer. To assert that the case also interpreted the Utah statutes as prohibiting the advertising
of light beer is to go beyond the scope of the decision.
The argument gives dicta the stature of law.
1

Dicta has been defined in 21 Corpus Juris Secundum p. 310: "to include a statement or holding in an
opinion not responsive to any issue and not necessary
to the decision of the case". While it is true that the
language used in the decison would seem on first blush
to support appellants' position, careful analysis of the
opinion as a whole demonstrates that the language
relied upon by the appellants is inconsistent with the
question specifically delineated and decided by the
court. Since the proposition stated in the language
relied upon by appellants was unnecessary for the resolution of this question, it must be characterized as dicta.
If the language relied upon by appellants in
Bird & Jex is dicta, the lower court was not in any way
obligated to follow it. While it is true that the rule

8

of stare decisis requires all inferior courts of the state
to follow the decisions of their highest court, it is equally
true that this applies only to the actual questions presented, discussed and decided. The statement of a
principle not necessary to the decision will not be
regarded either as a part of the decision or as a precedent necessary to the rule of stare decisis. Childers v.
Childers ( 1946) 74 Cal. A pp. 2d 56, 168 P .2d 218.
CONCLUSION
The lower court acted reasonably and correctly in
denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Bird & Jex clearly is not dispositive upon the
question now before this court. The Utah State Liquor
Control Commission has the authority to promulgate
regulations permitting the outdoor advertising of light
beer. It is submitted that the action of the lower court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE M. McMILLAN and
GORDON C. COFFMAN
l 020 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Galaxy Outdoor
Advertising, Inc.
Intervenor-Respondent
September II, 1967
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